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Abstract. This note is a discussion commenting on the paper by Ly
et al. on “Harold Jeffreys’s Default Bayes Factor Hypothesis Tests:
Explanation, Extension, and Application in Psychology” and on the
perceived shortcomings of the classical Bayesian approach to testing,
while reporting on an alternative approach advanced by Kamary et al.
(2014) as a solution to this quintessential inference problem.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Jeffreys’s development of the Bayes factor resembles an experimental design for
which one studies where the likelihood functions overlap, how they differ, and in
what way the difference can be apparent from the data.”
The discussion on Harold Jeffreys’s default Bayes factor hypothesis tests writ-
ten by Alexander Ly, Josine Verhagen, and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers is both a
worthwhile survey and an updating reinterpretation cum explanation of Harold
Jeffreys‘ views on testing. The historical aspects of the paper offer little grip for
critical discussion as they stand true to the unravelling of the testing perspective
in Harold Jeffreys’ Theory of Probability (ToP), as a worthy complement to our
earlier exegesis (Robert et al., 2009). I also agree with the focus chosen therein
on the construction of a default solution for the Bayes factor, as this issue is
both central to Jeffreys’ thinking and to the defence of the “Bayesian choice” in
hypothesis testing. My own discussion is therefore mostly written in the
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I discuss both the presentation
made by the authors and the argumentation coming from Jeffreys about using
Bayes factors. The next section presents further arguments against the use of the
Bayes factor, while Section 4 introduces the alternative of a mixture representa-
tion put forward by Kamary et al. (2014). Section 5 is a short conclusion.
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22. ON TOP AND ITS COMMENTARIES
Ly et al. (2015) starts with a short historical entry on Jeffreys’ work and career,
which includes four of his principles, quoted verbatim from the paper:
1. “scientific progress depends primarily on induction”;
2. “in order to formalize induction one requires a logic of partial belief” [thus
enters the Bayesian paradigm];
3. “scientific hypotheses can be assigned prior plausibility in accordance with
their complexity” [a.k.a., Occam’s razor];
4. “classical “Fisherian” p-values are inadequate for the purpose of hypothesis
testing”.
While I agree with those principles on a general basis, the third principle
remains too vague for my own taste and opens a Pandora box about the meanings
of what is simple and what is penalty. (I have had the same difficulty with the
call to Occam’s razor principle in other papers like Jefferys and Berger, 1992
and Consonni et al., 2013.) It is all very clear to follow such a rule for a one-
parameter distribution like the normal N (θ, 1) distribution, but much less so
with “a” model involving hundreds of parameters and latent variables. I do not
think Harold Jeffreys envisioned at all a general setting of comparing multiple
models, in particular because the (1/2, 1/2) partition of the probability mass has
very little to suggest in terms of extensions, with too many potential alternatives.
“Is it of the slightest use to reject a hypothesis until we have some idea of what to
put in its place?” H. Jeffreys, ToP (p.390)
I obviously support very much the above quote from Jeffreys’ ToP, as indeed
rejecting a null hypothesis does not sound as an ideal ultimate goal for statistical
inference, but I am also less than convinced about the argument that testing
should be separated from estimation (p.5), even though I recognise the need
for defining a separate prior and parameter. My central difficulty stands with the
issue of picking a prior probability of a model, when prior opinions about different
models are at best qualitative and at worst missing. For instance, when invoking
Occam’s razor (Rasmussen and Ghahramani, 2001), there is no constructive way
of deriving a prior probability P(M0) for model M0.
“The priors do not represent substantive knowledge of the parameters within the
model” H. Jeffreys, ToP (p.13)
A very relevant point made by the authors in this discussion of ToP is that
Harold Jeffreys only considered embedded or nested hypotheses, a fact that allows
for some common parameters between models and hence some form of reference
prior, as argued in Kamary et al. (2014). In Jeffreys’ ToP setting, it nonetheless
seems mathematically delicate to precise the notion of “common” parameters,
in particular to call for the same (improper) prior on both parameter sets, as
discussed in Robert et al. (2009). However, the most sensitive issue is, from my
perspective, the derivation of a reference prior on the parameter of interest, which
is both fixed under the null and perspective, the derivation of a reference prior on
the parameter of interest, which is both fixed under the null and unknown under
the alternative in ToP. This state of affairs leads to the unfortunate impossibility
of utilising improper priors in most testing settings. Harold Jeffreys thus tried
to calibrate the corresponding proper prior by imposing asymptotic consistency
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under the alternative and by introducing the notion of “exact” indeterminacy
under “completely uninformative” data. Unfortunately, this is not a well-defined
concept. That both predictives take the same values for such “completely un-
informative” data thus sounds more like a post-hoc justification than a way of
truly calibrating the Bayes factor: that any sample with too small a size is “com-
pletely uninformative” is for instance unconvincing. (Why shouldn’t one pick the
simplest model by default?) Further, to impose for the Bayes factor to be one
for all samples with too small a sample size sounds mathematically impossible
to achieve in full generality, although two specific cases are provided in ToP and
reproduced in the current paper. The reconstruction of Jeffreys’ derivation of
his reference prior on pp.10-12 of the authors’ discussion is quite illuminating of
those difficulties (while also praiseworthy for its clarity). It also shows that the
very notion of “common” parameter cannot be made into a precise mathematical
concept. For instance, if model M0 corresponds to the linear regression with a
single covariate
y = x1β1 + σ
and model M1 to the linear regression with an additional covariate
y = x1β1 + x2β2 + σ,
except for using the same symbols, there is plenty of room for arguing against the
fact that (β1, σ) is “common” to both models. We certainly expect β1 to shrink
as we introduce a secondary explanatory variable, while the variability of the ob-
servable around the regression function should diminish. A further mathematical
difficulty with a nested model is that a prior pi(β1, β2, σ) on the parameters of
the embedding model tells us nothing on the embedded model since pi(β1, 0, σ) is
not defined in a unique manner (Robert, 1993; Marin and Robert, 2010).
“The objective comparison between M+ and M1 is then to keep all aspects the
same pi+(σ) = pi1(σ).”
In the normal example, the authors recall and follow the proposal of Harold
Jeffreys to use an improper prior pi(σ) ∝ 1/σ on the nuisance parameter and
argue in his defence the quote above. I find their argument weak in that, if we
use an improper prior for pi(σ), the marginal likelihood on the data as given in
(9)—which should not be indexed by δ or σ since both are integrated out—is no
longer a probability density and I do not follow the argument that one should
use the same measure with the same constant both on σ alone—for the nested
hypothesis—and on the σ part of (µ, σ)—for the nesting hypothesis. Indeed,
we are considering two separate parameter spaces with different dimensions and
hence necessarily unrelated measures. Once again, this quote thus sounds more
like wishful thinking than like a genuine justification. Similarly, assumptions of
independence between δ = µ/σ and σ are not relevant for σ-finite measures (even
though Hartigan (1983) would object to this statement). Note that the authors
later point out that the posterior on σ varies between models despite using the
same data (which somewhat argues that the parameter σ is far from common
to both models!). From Jeffreys’s perspective, the [testing] Cauchy prior on δ is
only useful for the testing part and would thus have to be replaced with another
[estimation] prior once the model has been selected [by looking at the data]. This
may thus end up as a back-firing argument about the (far from unique) default
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4choice. Incidentally, I fail to understand in ToP the relevance of separating (10)
and s2 = 0 from the general case as this former event happens with probability
zero, making Jeffreys’ argument at best an approximation to the limiting case of
(11).
“Using Bayes’ theorem, these priors can then be updated to posteriors conditioned
on the data that were actually observed.”
The re-derivation of Jeffreys’ conclusion that a Cauchy prior should be used
on δ = µ/σ highlights the issue that this choice only proceeds from an imperative
of fat tails in the prior, without in the least solving the calibration of the Cauchy
scale, which has no particular reason to be set to 1. The choice thus involves
arbitrariness to a rather high degree. (Given the now-available modern computing
tools, it would be nice to see the impact of this scale γ on the numerical value
of the Bayes factor.) And the above choice may also proceed from a “hidden
agenda”, namely to achieve a Bayes factor that solely depends on the t statistic.
But this does not sound like a such compelling reason, given that the t statistic
is not sufficient in this setting.
In a separately interesting way, the authors mention the Savage-Dickey ratio
(p.17) as a computational technique to represent the Bayes factor for nested
models, without necessarily perceiving the mathematical difficulty with this ratio
that Marin and Robert (2011) exposed a few years ago. For instance, in the
psychology example processed in the paper, the test is between δ = 0 and δ ≥
0; however, if I set pi(δ = 0) = 0 under the alternative prior, which should
not matter [from a measure-theoretic perspective where the density is uniquely
defined almost everywhere], the Savage-Dickey representation of the Bayes factor
returns zero, instead of 9.18! The potential for trouble is even clearer in the one-
sided case illustrated on Figure 2, since the prior density is uniformly zero before
δ = 0 and can be anything, including zero at δ = 0.
“In general, the fact that different priors result in different Bayes factors should not
come as a surprise.”
The second example detailed in the paper is the test for a zero Gaussian corre-
lation. This is a sort of “ideal case” in that the parameter of interest is between
-1 and 1, hence makes the choice of a uniform U(-1,1) easy or easier to argue.
Furthermore, the setting is also “ideal” in that the Bayes factor simplifies down
to a marginal over the sample correlation %ˆ by itself, under the usual Jeffreys pri-
ors on means and variances. So we have here a second case where the frequentist
statistic behind the frequentist test[ing procedure] is also the single (and insuffi-
cient) part of the data used in the Bayesian test[ing procedure]. Once again, we
thus are in a setting where Bayesian and frequentist answers are in one-to-one
correspondence (at least for a fixed sample size) and where the Bayes factor al-
lows for a closed form through hypergeometric functions, even in the one-sided
case. (This is a result obtained by the authors, not by Harold Jeffreys who, as the
proper physicist he was, obtained approximations that are remarkably accurate!)
“The Bayes factor (...) balances the tension between parsimony and goodness of fit,
(...) against overfitting the data.”
In fine, I liked very much this re-reading of Jeffreys’ approach to Bayesian
testing, maybe the more because I now consider we should move away from this
approach as discussed below. However, I am not certain the discussion will help
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in convincing psychologists to adopt Bayes factors for assessing their experiments
as it may instead frighten them away. And as it does not bring an answer to the
vexing issue of the relevance of point null hypotheses. But the paper constitutes
a lucid and innovative treatment of the major advance represented by Jeffreys’
formalisation of Bayesian testing.
3. FURTHER MISGIVING ABOUT THE BAYES FACTOR
In this section, I extrapolate on some difficulties I have with the Bayes factor,
as discussed in more depth in Kamary et al. (2014).
The natural Bayesian decision-theoretic approach to decide between two mod-
els is to use a binary 0−1 loss function and to derive the posterior probabilities of
the model. However, since this approach depends on the choice of unnatural prior
weights, Harold Jeffreys advocates in ToP its replacement with Bayes factors that
eliminate this dependence. Unfortunately, while indicative of the respective sup-
ports brought by the data through their comparison with 1, Bayes factors escape
a direct connection with the posterior distribution, for the very reason they elim-
inate the prior weights. Therefore, they lack the direct scaling associated with
a posterior probability and a loss function. This implies that they face a sub-
sequent and delicate interpretation (or calibration) and explains why ToP does
not contain a section on decision making using Bayes factors, instead providing
in the Appendix a logarithmic scale of strength that is purely qualitative. Note
that posterior probabilities face similar difficulties, in that they suffer from the
unavoidable tendency to interpret them as p-values and to scale them against the
5% reference value when de facto they only report through a marginal likelihood
ratio the respective strengths of fitting the data to both models. (This difficulty
is not to be confused with the divergence in the [frequentist versus epistemic]
interpretations of the probability statement, as discussed in Fraser (2011) and
the ensuing comments.)
At a different semantic level, the long-going [or long-winded] criticism on the
Bayesian approach, namely the dependence on a subjective prior measure applies
here twofold: first in the linear impact of the prior weights of the models under
comparison and second in the lasting impact of the prior modelling on the pa-
rameter spaces of both models under comparison. (We stress as in Robert (2014)
a rather overlooked feature answering such criticisms (see, e.g., Spanos, 2013),
including the Lindley-Jeffreys (1957) paradox, namely the overall consistency of
Bayes factors.) However, the resulting discontinuity in the use of improper priors
is a feature I have always been uncomfortable with, since those improper pri-
ors are not justified (DeGroot, 1982) in most testing situations, leading to many
alternative if ad hoc solutions (Robert, 2001), where data is either used twice
(Aitkin, 2010) or split in artificial ways (Berger and Pericchi, 1996; Berger et al.,
1998).
As pointed out in the above, the posterior probability is more often associated
with a binary (accept vs. reject) outcome that is more suited for immediate deci-
sion (if any) than for model evaluation, in connection with the rudimentary loss
function behind it, while the Bayes factor is a smoother form of comparison that
should not in fine conclude with a (hard) decision. Given the current abuse of
p-values and significance tests (Johnson, 2013), we should advocate more strongly
this stand. In conjunction with this point, note further that returning a posterior
imsart-sts ver. 2009/02/27 file: Lindley.tex date: July 28, 2015
6probability or a Bayes factor offers no window into the uncertainty associated
with the decision itself, unless one proceeds through additional and most likely
costly simulation experiments.
From a computational perspective, let me recall there is no universally ac-
knowledged approach to compute marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors (Chen
et al., 2000; Marin and Robert, 2011), while some approaches are notoriously
misleading (Newton and Raftery, 1994). In a recent work about the validation of
ABC model selection (Robert et al., 2011; Marin et al., 2014), we also pointed
out the variability of the numerical estimates and in fine the utter dependence of
both posterior probabilities and Bayes factors on conditioning statistics, which
in turn undermines their validity for model assessment.
4. TESTING AS (MIXTURE) ESTIMATION
The alternative to testing via Bayes factors, as proposed in Kamary et al.
(2014), to which the reader is referred to for details, constitutes a paradigm shift
in the Bayesian processing of hypothesis testing and of model selection in that
it reformulates both the question and the answer into a new framework that
accounts for uncertainty and returns a posterior distribution instead of a single
number or a decision. As demonstrated in Kamary et al. (2014), this shift offers
convergent and naturally interpretable solution, while encompassing a more ex-
tended use of improper priors. The central idea to the approach is to adopt a
simple representation of the testing problem as a two-component mixture esti-
mation problem where the weights are formally equal to 0 or 1 and to estimate
those weights as in a regular mixture estimation framework. This approach is
inspired from the consistency results of Rousseau and Mengersen (2011) on esti-
mated overfitting mixtures, i.e., mixture models where the data is actually issued
from a mixture distribution with a smaller number of components.
More formally, given two statistical models,
M0 : x ∼ f0(x|θ0) , θ0 ∈ Θ0 and M1 : x ∼ f1(x|θ1) , θ1 ∈ Θ0 ,
Kamary et al. (2014) define the (arithmetic) encompassing mixture model
(1) Mα : x ∼ αf0(x|θ0) + (1− α)f1(x|θ1) ,
with a mixture weight 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, meaning that each element of the iid sample as-
sociated with the model comparison is considered as generated according toMα.
While this new and artificial model contains or encompasses bothM0 andM1 as
two special cases, that is, when α = 0 and α = 1, a standard Bayesian analysis
of the above mixture provides an estimate of the weight α, relying on a prior
distribution pi(α) with support the entire (0, 1) interval, e.g., a Beta Be(a0, a0)
distribution. This means that such a standard processing of the model will cre-
ate a posterior distribution on the weight α, given the data, which location on
the unit interval will induce evidence (and strength of evidence) in favour of
one model versus the other. For instance, when this posterior is concentrated
near zero, the data supports more strongly M1 than M0. Hence, this alternative
paradigm does not return a value in the binary set {0, 1} as a more traditional
decision strategy or a test would do. Thus, the mixture representation is quite
distinct from making a choice between both models (or hypotheses) or even from
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computing a posterior probability of M0 or M1. Inference on the mixture repre-
sentation bypasses the testing difficulties produced in the previous section in that
there is no decision involved. I thus consider it has the potential of a more natural
and easier to implement approach to testing, while not expanding on the total
number of parameters when compared with the original approach (as found in
ToP). Kamary et al. (2014) argue in favour of this shift from several perspectives,
ranging from inferential to computational, and I once again refer to this paper
for further implementation details, consistency proof, and examples.
While the encompassing mixture model Mα intrinsically differs from the true
model, given that the weight α can take any value in (0, 1), the production of a
posterior distribution on the weight α must be deemed to be a positive feature
of this completely different approach to testing in that it bypasses the vexing
issue of setting artificial prior probabilities on the different model indices and
that it measures the proximity of the data to both models by a probability to
allocate each datapoint to those models. Furthermore, the mixture model Mα
allows for the use of partially improper priors since both components may then
enjoy common parameters, as for instance location and scale parameters. This
feature implies that using the same reference measure on the nuisance param-
eters of both models is then absolutely valid. Estimating a mixture model by
MCMC tools is well-established (Diebolt and Robert, 1990; Celeux et al., 2000)
and bypasses the difficulty in computing the Bayes factor. At last, an approach
by mixture modelling is quite easily calibrated by solutions like the parametric
bootstrap, which that there is no decision involved. I thus consider this novel for-
malism has the potential of a better approach to testing, while not expanding on
the number of parameters when compared with the original approach (as found
in ToP). Kamary et al. (2014) argue in favour of this shift from several perspec-
tives, from inferential to computational, and I once again refer to this paper for
further details.
While the encompassing model Mα intrinsically differs from the real model,
given that the weight α can take any value in (0, 1), the production of a posterior
distribution on the weight α is a positive feature of this approach in that it
bypasses the vexing issue of setting artificial prior probabilities on model indices
and measures the proximity of the data to the models. Furthermore, Mα allows
for the use of partially improper priors since both components may then enjoy
common parameters, as for instance location and scale parameters. This implies
that using the same reference measure on the nuisance parameters of both models
is then completely valid. At last, the approach by mixture modelling is quite easily
calibrated by solutions like the parametric bootstrap, which provides a reference
posterior of α under each of the models under comparison.
From a practical perspective—even though it involves a paradigm shift from the
current practice of referring to a gold standard, like 0.05—, the implementation
of the principle of Kamary et al. (2014) means estimating the mixture model by a
computational tool like MCMC and exploiting the resulting posterior distribution
on α in the same way any posterior is to be interpreted. Rather than advocating
hard decision bounds associated with such a posterior pi(α|D), as in an alternative
p-value with similar drawbacks (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008), it is more natural
to contemplate the concentration of this distribution near the boundaries, 0 and
1, in absolute terms and relative to the concentration of a posterior associated
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concentration should be clear enough to conclude in favour of one model. Figure
1 illustrates this approach, for normal samples of sizes ranging from n = 10 to
n = 500, when opposing the point null N (0, 1) model (M1) to the alternative
N (µ, 1) model (M0), under a proper µ ∼ N (0, 1) prior. As can be inferred from
the left panel, the posterior estimates of α, whether posterior means or posterior
medians, concentrate faster with n on the relevant boundary, that is, close to
zero and in favour ofM0, than the exact posterior probability (associated with a
prior weight of 1/2 on both models, and hence allows us to conclude more quickly
about the evidence in favour of the null model. As seen from the right panel,
the impact of the hyper-parameter value in the prior modelling α ∼ Be(a0, a0)
remains moderate.
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Fig 1. (left) Boxplot of the posterior means (wheat) and medians (dark wheat) of the
mixture weight α, and of the posterior probabilities of model N (µ, 1) (blue) evaluated over
100 replicas of N (0, .72) datasets with sample sizes n = 10, 40, 100, 500; (right) evolution
across sample sizes of the averages of the posterior means and posterior medians of α,
and of the posterior probabilities P(M0|x), where M0 stands for the N (µ, 1) model. Each
posterior estimation of α is based on 104 Metropolis-Hastings iterations. [Source: Kamary
et al., 2014, with permission.]
5. CONCLUSION
“In induction there is no harm in being occasionally wrong; it is inevitable that we
shall be.” H. Jeffreys, ToP (p.302)
As a genuine pioneer in the field, Harold Jeffreys1 set a well-defined track,
namely the Bayes factor, for conducting Bayesian testing and by extension model
selection, a track that has become the norm in Bayesian analysis, while incorpo-
rating the fundamental aspect of reference priors and highly limited prior infor-
mation. However, I see this solution as a child of its time, namely, as impacted
by the on-going formalisation of testing by other pioneers like Jerzy Neyman or
Egon Pearson. Returning a single quantity for the comparison of two models fits
naturally in decision making, but I strongly feel in favour of the alternative route
that Bayesian model comparison should abstain from automated and hard deci-
sion making. Looking at the marginal likelihood of a model as evidence makes
it harder to refrain from setting decision bounds when compared with return-
1Whose above quote may be a pastiche of Keynes’ own 1933 “There is no harm in being
sometimes wrong – especially if one is promptly found out”.
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ing a posterior distribution on α or an associated predictive quantity, as further
discussed in Kamary et al. (2014).
Different perspectives on this issue of constructing reference testing solutions
are obviously welcome, from the incorporation of testing into the PC priors and
baseline models of (Simpson et al., 2014) to the non-local tests of Johnson and
Rossell (2010), and I would most gladly welcome exchanges on such perspectives.
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